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In previous work (Cropper et al.), we examined
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) decision to cancel or continue the regis-
tration of pesticides that went through its Special
Review process between 1975 and 1989. Our fo-
cus in that paper was on the final decision (Notice
of Final Determination) issued by the EPA at the
end of the rule-making process. Specifically, we
asked whether this decision could be explained by
the reported risks and benefits associated with pes-
ticide use, and by the comments of special-interest
groups that were entered in the public docket.
In this paper, we examine more closely the
stages of the rule-making process: We seek to ex-
plain the proposed decision issued by the EPA,
and we examine how this decision was modified to
arrive at a final decision. In the rule-making pro-
cess, a proposed decision is issued after the EPA
completes its risk-benefit analysis of a pesticide,
but before the public is given a chance to comment
formally. We wish to see if the proposed decision
cart be explained by the risks and benefits of pes-
ticide use, as measured at the time of the proposed
decision. We also wish to determine whether in-
terest groups that subsequently comment publicly
on the regulation appear to exert an influence on
the proposed decision.
The second set of questions we examine deals
with changes that occur between the proposed and
final decisions. In the set of pesticide decisions we
examine, 39% of the initial decisions to cancel and
16% of the initial decisions to continue pesticide
usage were reversed. If the rule-making process
works as it is supposed to, reversals should occur
because of information entered in the public docket
during the official comment period or because of
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revisions in the EPA’s estimates of the risks and
benefits of pesticide use. The main question of
interest here is whether the final decision can be
viewed as a modification of the proposed decision,
either by new information or by the comments of
special-interest groups, or whether the final deci-
sion is rethought in light of all available informa-
tion, implying that the weights assigned to risks
and benefits also change.
A third issue that we examine is what causes the
EPA’s estimates of risks and benefits to change
between the proposed and final decisions. Because
there are substantial changes in benefit and, espe-
cially, in risk data between the two decisions, and
because so many decisions are reversed, one might
wonder if the changes in data are prompted by a
desire to justify a reversal of the proposed deci-
sion. We are happy to report that this does not
appear to be the case.
An Overview of the EPA’s Pesticide
Registration Process
In its 1972 amendments to the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Congress
required the EPA to reregister the approximately
40,000 pesticides previously approved for sale in
the United States. In the 1978 amendments to
FIFRA, this task was simplified by requiring re-
registration of the 600 active ingredients used in all
these pesticides, rather than the pesticides them-
selves.
Reregistration of each active ingredient requires
assembling the data necessary to evaluate whether
the active ingredient causes “unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment” for each use for which
the substance is registered. If, in the process of
collecting this data, it is determined that the active
ingredient poses sufficient risks to humans or an-
imals, the active ingredient is put through a Special
Review process. The purpose of the process is to
determine whether the risks posed by the active78 October 1992 NJARE
Table 1. Active Ingredients in the Pesticide Data Base
Active Number of Number of Number of
Ingredient Year Food-Use Registrations Proposed Cancellations Final Cancellations
DBCP 78 12 1 12
Amitraz 79 2 1 1
Chlorobenzilate 79 3 2 2
Endritr 79 8 4 4
Pronamide 79 4 0 0
Dimethoate 80 25 0 0
Benomyl 82 26 0 0
Diallate 82 10 10 0
Oxyfluorfen 82 3 0 0
Toxaphene 82 11 7 7
Trifturalin 82 25 0 0
EDB 83 18 4 18
Ethalfluralin 83 3 0 0
Lindane 83 8 7 0
Silvex 85 6 6 6
2, 4, 5-T 85 2 2 2
Dicofol 86 4 4 0
Alachlor 87 10 3 0
Captan 89 65 65 44
Totals 245 116 96
ingredient are outweighed by the benefits of its
use.
The results of the risk-benefit analyses are pub-
lished in what are known as Position Documents 2
and 3 (PD 2/3). At the end of PD 2/3, the follow-
ing regulatory outcomes are considered for each
use: (1) cancellation of registration; (2) suspension
of registration; (3) continuation of registration,
subject to certain restrictions; (4) unrestricted con-
tinuation of registration.
Publication of PD 2/3 is followed by a comment
period, during which members of the public, in-
cluding growers, public-interest groups, and reg-
istrants, can respond to the proposed regulations.
If cancellation or restrictions on use are contem-
plated, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and the EPA’s Scientific Advisory Board
are asked to review the risk-benefit analyses. Final
regulatory decisions, together with the names of
commenters, are published in Position Document 4
(PD 4), which becomes law unless a hearing is
requested by interested parties.
Between 1975, when the Special Review pro-
cess was initiated, and 1989, a total of 68 Special
Reviews were begun (U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency). Of these, 18 ended at the pre–
Special Review stage, 37 had been completed by
December 1989, and 13 were ongoing, Our study
focuses on a subset of the 37 completed reviews,
that is, those that both involve pesticides used on
food crops and are suspected human carcinogens.
We focus on this subset because health risks other
than risk of cancer are seldom quantified, which
makes a quantitative analysis of regulatory deci-
sions difficult.
The set of cancer-causing food-use pesticides
that have gone through Special Review is listed in
Table 1. Note that although there are only 19 such
pesticides, they were registered for use on a total
of 245 crops. What we shall try to explain is the
decision to cancel or not cancel each of these
uses.l
Factors Influencing the Proposed
Cancellation Decision
The decision to cancel a pesticide registration is to
be made by weighing the benefits of pesticide use
against the risks that pesticide use poses to humans
and to the environment. We therefore assume that
the probability that pesticide i will be proposed for
cancellation for use on cropj is an increasing func-
‘ Of the 245 final decisions in our data base, 39% represent cancella-
tions, 4% suspensions of registration for failure tu provide data, 570
unrestrictedcontinuations, and 52% continuations with restrictions, The
types of restrictions typically imposed consist of measures to protect
pesticide mixers and applicators, such as requiringthat protective cloth-
ing be worn, or replacing human flaggers with mechanical ones, These
decisions are to be made by comparing the risks and benefits of the
restrictions; however, the position documents typically do not contain
enoughdata to permit an analysis of each restriction. For this reason, we
consideronlytwo regulatoryoutcomes:continuationof registration (with
or without restrictions) or cancellation, Suspensions for failure to pro-
vide data are grouped with continuations, since registrations are contin-
ued as soon as the data are provided,Cropper et al.
tion of the vector of risks of pesticide use, RV,and
a decreasing function of the vector of benefits, Bti,
(1) P(cancelij) = P(cxlRij + eX2BU + q > ()),
where a ~and CX2 are vectors of weights attached to
risks and benefits, and Uuis a random error term
capturing unmeasured risks and benefits.
For the substances in Table 1, risks include the
excess lifetime risk of cancer to pesticide applica-
tors, to mixers of pesticides, and to consumers
who ingest pesticide residues on food. 2These risks
are reported as the number of cancer cases per
million exposed persons. For example, it is esti-
mated that 70 persons out of every 1 million per-
sons who eat almonds sprayed with benomyl (for
70 years) will develop cancer at some time during
their life.
To calculate the total number of cancer cases
that are estimated to result from pesticide use, this
risk number must be multiplied by the size of the
exposed population. For most dietary risks, the
entire U.S. population is assumed to be exposed.
Since this number is constant for all pesticide/crop
combinations, it does not matter whether we use
risk per million exposed persons or total number of
cancer cases as an independent variable. Although
the number of persons who either mix or apply the
pesticide in question does vary across pesticide
crop combinations, the size of these populations is
rarely reported. We therefore assume that the ap-
plicator and mixer populations are constant across
all observations.
An additional problem is that risk estimates are
sometimes not reported for one of the three groups.
In earlier work, we handled this problem by re-
cording a value of zero whenever risk data were
missing and then using a dummy variable to indi-
cate that the data were in fact missing. The coef-
ficients of the missing risk dummies were, how-
ever, not significantly different from zero, imply-
ing that missing risk information is treated as being
equivalent to zero risk. In the work reported here,
we have, therefore, omitted the missing risk
dummy variables.
Pesticides also pose risks to fetuses and may
cause genetic mutations. Because these risks are
inherently difficult to quantify, we resort to a
dummy variable to indicate that a risk may cause
adverse reproductive effects. Danger to nontarget
animals (fish, birds) is likewise handled by a
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dummy variable that is equal to one if the pesticide
poses risks to marine life,
The benefits of pesticide use should, ideally, be
measured as the streams of consumer and producer
surpluses that would be lost if the pesticide were
banned. In practice, producer surplus is reported
more often than consumer surphIs, and it is most
often reported for the year immediately following
cancellation. Our estimate of benefits is therefore
lost producer surplus in the year after proposed
cancellation, measured in 1986 dollars. When pro-
ducer benefit data are missing, we record whether
banning the ~esticide is or is not likely to result in
yield losses.
Column 2 of Table 2 presents maximum-
likelihood estimates of equation (1), assuming that
the error term Uijis independently and identically
normally distributed for all pesticide/crop combi-
nations. The results are not very comforting. Al-
though increases in dieta~ risks significantly in-
crease the likelihood that a pesticide wilI be pro-
posed for cancellation, risks to applicatorethe
group receiving the highest per capita dose of pes-
ticides—are not statistically significant. Risks to
mixers are statistically significant, but of the
wrong sign: an increase in risk of cancer to mixers
reduces the chances that a pesticide is proposed for
cancellation. It is also surprising that adverse re-
productive effects do not increase the likelihood
that a pesticide is proposed for cancellation.
There are similar anomalies in the effect of pro-
ducer benefits on the probability of proposed can-
cellation. As expected, an increase in producer
benefits, when benefits are quantified, reduces the
probability of proposed cancellation. The absence
of benefit data, however, also decreases the
chances of proposed cancellation, even if cancel-
lation of the pesticide will not reduce yields.
Examination of the data suggests that it is two
pesticides—DBCP and EDB—that are responsible
for these anomalous results. The problem is that
both pesticides posed very high risks of cancer to
applicators and mixers, and also caused adverse
reproductive effects. In the proposed decision,
however, the EPA declined to ban DBCP and EDB
in most uses (see Table 1). If the EPA had, in fact,
initially proposed to ban DBCP and EDB on all
crops, the anomalous results in column 2 of Table
2 would disappear. This is illustrated in column 3
of Table 2, in which equation (1) has been reesti-
mated assuming that all uses of EDB and DBCP
2The assumptions used by the EPA in calculating these risks are
described (and criticized) in Crepper et al. In the analysis reported here,
we take the EPA’s estimates at face value, on the groundsthat these risk
estimates are those seen bv oolicvmakers.
3Means and staudard deviations of all risk sod benefits variables, at
the time of the fiird decision, are qm’ted in Cropper et al., Table 2.
Variable means arrd standard deviations at the time of the proposed
decision are reported in column 1of Table 2.80 October 1992 NJARE
Table 2. Probit Results, Proposed and Final Decisions
Parameter Estimates and t-Statisticsb
Means and Proposed Proposed Proposed Final Final
Variable Std. Dev.a Decision Decisionc Decisionc Decision Decision
Intercept — 0.11 -0.24 –0.52 –0.88 –1.38
(0.48) (1.05) (1.22) (5.29) (1.90)
Diet Risk per Million 497.5 0.01 0.55 0.20 4.3E-3
Persons (2570.4) (2.34) (3.08) (1.22) — (2.17)
Applicator Risk per Million 3064.1 1.3E-5 4.lE-4 6.9E-4 — 6.5E-4
Persons (13553.3) (0.75) (3.82) (4.88) (2.65)
Mixer Risk per Million 155.4 – 0.03 — — — 2.9E-3
Persons (741.7) (1.84) (0.19)
Producer Benefits (in 11.14 – 0.08 –0.02 – 0.02 –0.07
millions of 1986$) (42.22) (4.74) (2.38) (2.43) — (2.75)
Producer Benefits Missing 0.14 – 1.59 – 1.32 – 1.24 –2.40
x Yield Loss (0.34) (4.93) (4.27) (2.80) — (5.34)
Producer Benefits Missing 0.13 – 1.47 –1.24 – 0.46 – 0.68
x NO Yield Loss (0.34) (4.63) (3.98) (0.97) — (1.06)
Reproductive Effects 0.68 –0.17 0.41 –0.30 0.50
(0.47) (0.76) (1.82) (0.81) (1.29)
Danger to Marine Life 0.52 1.00 0.39 – 0.49 – 0.75
(0.50) (4.74) (1.77) (1.35) — (1.40)
“4623 — — — 0.01
(3.63)
Academics Comment — — – 1.48 – 1.25 – 1.85
(3.22) (4.88) (3.50)
Growers Comment — — — 1.46 – 1.52 –1.92
(2.68) (3.02) (2.49)
Environmental Groups — — 2.93 1.63 3.33
Comment (6.95) (7.33) (6.12)
Log-likelihood — – 108.3 –98.8 –48.7 – 105.9 –48.1
% Correctly Predicted — 80.2 82.2 93.0 78.9 93.4
‘Standard deviations are in parentheses. These descriptive statistics were calculatedfrom data available at the time of the proposed
decision and for only those observations where data were not missing.
bt-statistics are in parentheses.
CWithEDB and DBCP assumed to be banned at the time of the proposed decision.
were banned at the time of the proposed decision.
There is, in fact, some justification for making this
assumption. Immediately after its proposed deci-
sion on DBCP, the EPA ordered an emergency
suspension of DBCP on all crops. The EPA also
ordered art emergency suspension of EDB on all
crops between the proposed and final EDB deci-
sions.4 All uses of EDB and DBCP were banned in
the final decisions.
Treating all uses of EDB and DBCP as banned
significantly increases the magnitude of the effects
of dietary risk and applicator risk in the proposed
decision.5 In interpreting these coefficients, one
must remember that the population of persons ex-
4 We have anecdotal evidence that the EPA considered ordering an
emergency suspension of afl EDB uses in October 1977, three years
before the proposed deeision on EDB,
5 Mixer risk must be droppedfrom the equation when all uses of EDB
and DBCP arc treated as banned, because a fmticide is always banned
whenever mixer risk is positive. The coefficient of mixer risk therefow
approaches infinity.
posed to dietary risks is much larger than the pop-
ulation of pesticide applicators. Using the coeffi-
cient on producer benefits to convert the dietary
and applicator risks to implied values per cancer
case avoided yields an implied value of $9 million
(1986$) for consumers and $72 million (1986$) for
pesticide applicators.b Treating EDB and DBCP as
initially banned also reverses the sign on reproduc-
tive effects and renders it statistically significant at
the 5% level.
One question of interest is whether groups such
as grower organizations or environmental advo-
cacy groups exert any influence on the EPA’s pro-
posed decisions. Because contact between the EPA
and special-interest groups was not a matter of
public record until 1985, it is difficult to establish
whether any interaction between interest groups
and the EPA occurred prior to the proposed deci-
6The details of this calculationare described in the appendixto Crop-
per et al.Cropper et al.
sion. It is, however, possible to see whether spe-
cial-interest groups that lodged comments in the
public docket following the proposed decision ap-
pear to have influenced that decision. To examine
this, we include in equation (1) intervener dummy
variables equal to 1 if any member of the group in
question lodged comments during the public com-
ment period. Since these comments were made af-
ter the proposed decision, the only reason for in-
cluding them in the proposed decision equation is
because they are suggestive of activities that may
have occurred before the proposed decision was
issued. The fact that subsequent comments by en-
vironmental advocacy groups increase the changes
of a proposed cancellation suggests that these
groups may have exerted some influence on the
proposed decision. The positive sign on comments
by grower organizations, however, suggests re-
verse causality: a proposed ban induces grower or-
ganizations to comment.
Why Do Pesticide Decisions Change?
The models presented in the previous section do a
fairly good job of explaining the EPA’s proposed
decision to ban or not to ban a pesticide. What is
notable, however, is how many proposed decisions
are reversed at the end of the public comment pe-
riod. If we treat EDB and DBCP as initially
banned, all reversals are in one direction: decisions
to initially ban a pesticide are reversed to allow the
pesticide to be used. Indeed, 45 of the 116 pro-
posed decisions to ban a pesticide were reversed.
Why did this occur?
One explanation may be revealed in Table 3,
which describes the changes that occurred in risk
and benefit information between the proposed and
final decisions. Fully one-half of the estimates of
dietary risk changed between the two decisions, as
did 29% of the estimates of applicator risk and
21% of the estimates of producer benefits. If
changes in information alone could explain rever-
sals of decisions, one would expect the model in
column 3 of Table 2 to provide good predictions of
the final decision, assuming that the values of the
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independent variables were updated to reflect new
information. (We label this predictor X4’@23,
since it uses weights from the PD 2/3 model, but
values of the independent variables from PD 4.)
This model, however, correctly predicts only 63%
of final decisions.
Another factor that should matter is the com-
ments of special-interest groups. Intervener
dummy variables, together with the predicted
value of the decision, X4’@23,are used in column
5 of Table 2 to explain the final decision. Even
adding commenters to the equation does not pro-
duce a model that predicts very well: The model in
column 5 predicts only 7990 of the final decisions
correctly.
This suggests that commenters and changes in
risk and benefit estimates alone cannot explain the
final decision. What must be happening is that the
weights attached to risks and benefits change the
proposed and final decisions. This hypothesis is
examined by estimating a model that allows the
weights attached to risks and benefits in the final
decision to differ from the weights used in the
proposed decision.
This model, which appears in column 6 of Table
2, clearly outperforms the naive model of column
5: it predicts 93% of the proposed decisions cor-
rectly. Moreover, a test of the null hypothesis that
the weights on risks and benefits in the final deci-
sion (column 6) are identical to those in the pro-
posed decision (column 3) can be rejected at the
5% level.
What is interesting is not simply that the weights
change, but also the direction in which they
change. In column 6, the implied value per cancer
case avoided is only $21,000 (1986$) for dietary
risks and $35 million (1986$) for applicator risks,
a sharp decline when compared to the values im-
plied by the proposed decision. This, however,
does not seem surprising. After subjecting a pes-
ticide to Special Review, it would, perhaps, seem
surprising if the EPA was not disposed to ban it.
Anecdotal evidence about the influence wielded by
environmental groups at the EPA during the period
studied lends support to this hypothesis. The final
decision, on the other hand, reflects the outcome
Table 3. Change in Risk and Benefit Data between Proposed and Final Decisions
Percent of Observations Diet Applicator Mixer Producer
Where: Risks Risks Risks Benefits
There is no change in information 49.6% 71.1% 93.0% 78.9%
Data that is originally missing is known 11.6% 14.0% 7.0% 4.6940
Data that is originally known is considered missing 0.070 0.8% 0.0% 8.3%
Values are increased 12.4V0 8.7% 0.0% 4.570
Values are decreased 26 .4% 5.4% 0.090 3.7%82 October 1992 NJARE
of a political process in which those who may be
hurt by the regulation have an opportunity to be
heard. Sensitivity to such groups may explain the
increased weight given costs relative to benefits in
reaching a final decision.
Why Do Risk and Benefit Estimates Change?
A final issue that we address is what causes risk
and benefit information to change between the pro-
posed and final decisions. Although changes in
information do not appear to be the main factor
explaining reversals of decisions, it would be dis-
turbing if information was altered to justify a re-
versal of decision. To test the hypothesis that in-
formation did not change randomly, we regressed
the difference between the PD 4 and the PD 2/3
values of each risk variable on commenter dum-
mies and a variable equal to 1 if there was no
change in decision between PD 2/3 and PD 4 and
equal to Oif the PD 2/3 decision to ban the pesti-
cide was reversed at the PD 4 stage. (A similar
regression was run for the change in producer ben-
efits.)
No systematic pattern emerges from the change
in data regressions. Commenter dummies are often
significant, but of the wrong sign. The change in
decision variable is never significant at conven-
tional levels.
Conclusions
In our earlier work, we were encouraged by the
fact that the EPA appears to have balanced the
risks of pesticide use against the benefits in reach-
ing a final decision to cancel or continue a pesti-
cide. The results reported here are similarly en-
couraging. Risks and benefits appear to be bal-
anced in reaching a proposed decision, although
the initially high values placed on small risk re-
ductions decline by the time a final decision is
issued. Moreover, the large number of changes
that occur in risk and benefit estimates between
the two decisions cannot be systematically ex-
plained either by the intervention of special-
interest groups or by the desire to justify a change
in decision. These results suggest that the rule-
making process works.
This is not to suggest that pesticide decisions
could not be improved upon. We emphasize that
the estimates of risks and benefits used in our study
are those reported by the agency in its position
documents. The limitations of these estimates are
well known. Moreover, the practice of evaluating
pesticides one at a time introduces the possibility
that a suboptimal decision maybe made, compared
to a world in which a class of substitutes is con-
sidered simultaneously. These, however, are mat-
ters that the agency appears to be attempting to
remedy.
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